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The cloud’s unstable design has had a significant effect on 
digital forensics. Promised efficiencies of the cloud map 
fairly well into the digital forensic regime, particularly for 
investigations where all people with relevant information 
are independently doing their own searching. However, 
as more data migrates to the cloud there are burdens 
on privacy, security and the development of forensic 
quality evidence: particularly off-shored data, persistent 
file rotation and frequent modification of metadata. This 
article explores these difficulties in light of existing and 
proposed standards. The re-interpretation of procedural 
and evidence law may be needed to reduce the risk of 
injustice as cloud architectures evolve.
Introduction 
The ‘cloud’1 is a vague and broad term for a set of on-line 
services, e.g., SaaS, IaaS, PaaS offering IT savings and 
new functionality.2 Early cloud experiences indicated 
problems between the advantages offered by cloud 
services and traditional forensic practices. This article 
explores the public policy forces that may shape 
the future of cloud forensics. Cloud advocates claim 
transformative benefits: economies of scale, reliability, 
the ability to increase resources when necessary, 
ubiquitous accessibility, and enabling collaboration.3 
However, cynics of cloud computing argue that cloud 
services are unreliable for the inexperienced.4 Despite the 
need for caution, wholesale migration to data hosting by 
cloud service providers (CSP) seems inevitable, and cloud 
forensics remains an unexplored territory for security and 
forensic professionals.5 
Cyberforensic needs in the cloud are important to law 
enforcement, regulators, litigators, investigators, and the 
intelligence communities, together with the providers 
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1 See generally Stephen Mason and Esther 
George, ‘Digital evidence and “cloud” 
computing’, 27 Computer L. and Security 
Rev. 524-528 (September 2011).
2 David Mitchell Smith, ‘Hype Cycle for Cloud 
Computing’, Gartner RAS Core Research 
Note No. (1 August 2012) (‘While clearly 
maturing and beyond the Peak of Inflated 
Expectations, cloud computing continues 
to be one of the most hyped subjects in IT. 
We look at the different aspects of the topic 
and where the technologies are on Gartner’s 
Hype Cycle for Cloud Computing, 2012.’).
3 See generally Peter Mell and Timothy 
Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud 
Computing, NIST, Spec. Pub. No. 800-145 at 
6 (September 2011) available at http://csrc.
nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/
SP800-145.pdf (sets standard cloud 
definitions including ‘Essential [cloud] 
Characteristics’):
 NIST defines Essential [cloud] Characteristics 
to include (paraphrased here):
(i) On-demand self-service (unilaterally, 
without CSP human interaction),
(ii) Broad network access (varying consumer 
platforms obtaining access to data and 
processing capacity through networks),
(iii) Resource pooling (multi-tenant model 
of physical computing resources 
(storage, processing, memory, and 
network bandwidth) with ‘location 
independence’ such that consumers 
have no control or knowledge over the 
resources’ exact location),
(iv) rapid elasticity (seemingly unlimited and 
the ability to increase resources when 
necessary), and
(v) metered service (usage directly dictates 
variable pricing).
 Hereinafter to avoid confusion, the term 
‘client’ is given only the computer services 
definition: user workstation and associated 
software. ‘Client’ is not used in the sense 
of consumer purchasing services from an 
independent service organization (ISO). 
Consistent with this convention, the term 
‘consumer’ is used to identify the buyer of 
services from an ISO.
4 For instance, see Michael Daconta, 
‘REALITY CHECK-Commentary: Why 
cloud computing is still a red herring’, 
GNC (11 September 2009) available at 
http://gcn.com/articles/2009/09/14/
reality-check-cloud-computing-as-red-
herring.aspx (arguing cloud successes are 
largely proprietary clouds and prudence 
demands that government should set 
cloud standards before plunging into 
significant cloud deployments) citing Art 
Whittmann, ‘Practical Analysis: Are We 
Sure this Isn’t Clouded Judgment? INFO 
WEEK 11 April 2009) available at http://www.
informationweek.co.uk/cloud-computing/
software/practical-analysis-are-we-sure-this-
isnt/216500080.
5 Keyun Ruan, Joe Carthy, Tahar Kechadi and 
Mark Crosbie, ‘Cloud Forensics’ Chapter 2 
in Gilbert Peterson and Sujeet Shenoi (eds), 
7th IFIP ADVANCES IN DIGITAL FORENSICS 
VII, vol. 361, (2011 Springer: Berlin and 
Heidelberg):
 ‘Cloud forensics is a cross discipline of 
cloud computing and digital forensics. 
… Digital forensics is the application of 
computer science principles to recover 
electronic evidence for presentation in a 
court of law. Cloud forensics is a subset of 
network forensics. Network forensics deals 
with forensic investigations of networks. 
Cloud computing is based on broad 
network access. Therefore, cloud forensics 
follows the main phases of network 
forensics with techniques tailored to cloud 
computing environments.’
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of relevant consultancy services. Increasingly access is 
needed to content, metadata, log records and document 
attachments located in the cloud. Cloud security 
and cloud forensics share the same characteristics 
of information assurance: economics, data integrity, 
accessibility, public policy constraints and the enabling 
technologies;6 all are predictable problems deduced from 
the economics of security.7 
While the evaluation of cloud economics remains 
in its infancy,8 cloud efficiencies may be overstated. 
This problem is exacerbated because CSPs target 
unsophisticated consumers, habitually exaggerate cloud 
benefits, and cloud consumers too frequently fail in their 
own due diligence despite the well-known, traditional 
contracting risks for unsophisticated consumers.9 
This article assumes the reader is familiar with cloud 
architecture and functionality. However, a provisional 
cloud definition can provoke discussion and analysis, 
even as cloud architectures and services evolve.
A definition from the National Institute for Standards 
and Technology (NIST) provides a useful starting point.10 
Cloud Service Models include Software as a Service 
(SaaS) in which the cloud consumer uses the CSP’s 
application (programs) running on a cloud (hardware) 
infrastructure, making these accessible from various 
customer devices, such as using a web browser for 
e-mail for instance. The customer does not manage or 
control the infrastructure, network, servers, operating 
systems, storage or application capabilities, other 
than the possible exception to a limited extend to 
re-configure the settings. Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
permits customers to create or acquire application 
programs and arrange these to the CSP’s cloud-based 
infrastructure. The CSP then manages or controls the 
underlying cloud infrastructure (e.g., network, servers, 
operating systems, storage). Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) enables the CSP to provide processing, storage, 
networks, and other fundamental computing resources 
that permits the customer to install and run arbitrary 
software (e.g., operating systems, applications). In IaaS, 
the customer has control over operating systems, storage, 
and the applications, but not over the underlying cloud 
infrastructure.11 
Argument: the cloud benefits digital forensics
The promises of efficiency made by proponents of cloud 
technology translate well into the digital forensics 
domain. The cloud might enable lower costs and 
enhanced effectiveness in marshalling and collecting 
electronically stored information (ESI) for review, analysis 
and use as ‘forensic quality evidence.’ Could the cloud 
enable ‘crowd sourcing’ of investigatory data?12 If so this 
arguably might lower dispute resolution costs by making 
pre-trial discovery documents in civil litigation accessible 
to the public.13 Document availability in various ‘cloud-
like’ environments illustrates that cloud-based discovery 
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6 A complete treatment of cloud insecurity is 
beyond the scope of this article, but such 
matters intimately affect cloud forensics. 
See generally, B. R. Kandukuri, V. R. Paturi 
and A. Rakshit, ‘Cloud Security Issues’, 
2009 SERVICES COMPUTING (IEEE) 517 
(September 2009); Tim Mather, Subra 
Kumaraswamy and Shahed Latif, CLOUD 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY: AN ENTERPRISE 
PERSPECTIVE ON RISKS AND COMPLIANCE, 
(O’Reilly Media 2009); L. M. Kaufman, 
‘Can Public-Cloud Security Meet Its Unique 
Challenges?’ 8 IEEE Sec.and Priv. 55 (July-
Aug. 2010); Ronald L. Krutz and Russell Dean 
Vines, CLOUD SECURITY: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO SECURE CLOUD COMPUTING 
(Wiley 2010); Vic (J.R.) Winkler, SECURING 
THE CLOUD: CLOUD COMPUTER SECURITY 
TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS (Syngress 2011).
7 For instance, see John W. Bagby, ‘Assessing 
Critical Infrastructure Risk After a Decade 
of Fragmented Regulation of Security 
Protections’, No. ALSB2011_0110; Academy 
of Legal Studies in Business, New Orleans 
LA 8.4.11 available at http://faculty.ist.psu.
edu/bagby/Pubs/ALSB2011_0110_paper.
pdf (arguing market failure in achieving 
incentives sufficient to optimize investment 
in cyber-infrastructure security due to: (i) a 
complex, layered supply chain, (ii) situations 
where different people have vastly different 
amounts of information, (iii) externalities, 
(iv) people who take advantage without 
paying for the cost of the benefit, (v) direct 
costs and uncertain benefits, and (vi) hacker 
incentives).
 8 See generally Asoke K. Talukder, Lawrence 
Zimmerman and H.A N. Prahalad, ‘Cloud 
Economics: Principles, Costs, and Benefits’, 
Chapter 20 in N. Antonopoulos and L. Gillam 
(eds.) Cloud Computing: Principles, Systems 
and Applications, (2010 Springer-Verlag 
London Ltd.), (in which they develop a 
conceptual model: the ‘Cloud Computing 
Reference Model’).
9 For instance, see Stuart D. Levi and Kelly C. 
Riedel, ‘Cloud Computing: Understanding 
the Business and Legal Issues’, 
Practicallaw.com (2010) available at http://
us.practicallaw.com/8-501-5479.
10 Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, ‘The NIST 
Definition of Cloud Computing’, NIST, 
Spec. Pub. No. 800-145 at 6 (Sep.2011) 
available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
11 Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, ‘The NIST 
Definition of Cloud Computing’.
12 It is interesting to think that the move 
to the cloud, combined with predictive 
coding techniques could create world that 
is significantly simpler; but, it is as of yet 
uncertain as to whether such techniques 
would satisfy existing legal requirements.
13 For instance, see Master Settlement 
Agreement (web site), Office of Attorney 
General, State of California Department 
of Justice, available at http://oag.ca.gov/
tobacco/msa. The National Association 
of States’ Attorneys General (NAAG) also 
provides access to litigation repositories 
of tobacco litigation documents, available 
at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/
tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with%20
Sig%20Pages%20and%20Exhibits.pdf.
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repositories enhance research and public policy.14 
A ‘Litigation Online Document Collection’ resides in 
the cloud 
Electronic discovery costs could be reduced with 
ubiquitously accessible, litigation-readiness rooms 
located in the cloud. As multiple litigants contribute and 
are authorized to obtain access to these repositories, 
this design could replace physical storage media. Such 
a litigation-readiness room could be either proprietary 
and confidential or open source for public accessibility. 
The analogy is to a war room, which is a central physical 
repository of relevant information to enable coordinated 
expertise in sense-making.15 The resulting concentration 
facilitates the formulation of findings, strategic planning 
and expert analysis for decision-making. A famous war 
room was used by Winston Churchill in WWII; Churchill 
declared shortly after becoming Prime Minister, ‘This is 
the room from which I will direct the war.’16 In physical war 
rooms the participants project images, hang maps, and 
display potentially relevant data to assist in analysis and 
planning activities for various missions. Such investment 
in war room facilities, training and readiness are most 
justified in high stakes situations. War rooms concentrate 
information, the development of hypotheses, the testing 
of assertions, the stimulation of debate and ultimate 
decision-making where transaction and communication 
costs are reduced, delays minimized and relevant 
considerations are conveniently juxtaposed.
In adapting such traditional war room designs to 
litigation, pre-trial discovery, political campaigns 
and crisis management, the modern embodiment is 
particularly useful during crises where urgency demands 
swift, thorough and expert response. An electronic 
litigation-readiness room, possibly located in the cloud, 
constitutes a repository of documents, data and other 
information. Thus, users have easy access to a robust 
literature collection of primary and secondary litigation 
documents, often made selectively available to defined 
groups but also potentially publicly – a form of ‘open 
source’ forensics.
Electronic evidence repositories could encourage 
settlements on litigation claims theretofore considered 
infeasible. Public cloud repositories of electronic 
discovery or disclosure and other cyber-forensic data 
arguably enhances the collaborative advantages17 of 
free collaborative efforts for open source intelligence 
investigations.18 
Of course, there are legal risks in going beyond true 
open sources, such as in using clandestine investigatory 
methods. There are regulatory, civil, and criminal 
liabilities for wire tapping,19 burglary,20 treason or 
espionage,21 assault,22 bribery,23 economic espionage or 
trade secret theft,24 among others. Defensive hacking and 
some cyber forensics methods considered acceptable for 
national intelligence purposes, such as evidence collected 
in disrespect of the search and seizure protections of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, will not be 
acceptable. Moreover, indiscriminate on-line forensics, 
particularly involving intelligence activities crossing 
national borders, risks international retaliation, trade 
sanctions and wholesale trade bans.25 
Counter argument: the cloud impedes digital 
forensics 
Many cloud-based services expose digital forensics to 
new forms of failure. Some cloud services undermine fair 
and due process. Most centrally, cloud data is generally 
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14 As a result of considerable tobacco 
litigation, including complaints filed by 
46 state attorneys general in the U.S. and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
several tobacco document databases are 
currently supported by stable, non-cloud 
data providers. Presumably, some of the 
tobacco documents are cloud-based. For 
example, the University of California-San 
Francisco (UCSF) Library and Center for 
Knowledge Management hosts the Legacy 
Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL) under 
funds provided by the American Legacy 
Foundation. The UCSF Tobacco Documents 
Bibliography permits search of published 
research into various effects of tobacco 
and the tobacco industry using key word 
and Boolean search techniques as well as 
traditional bibliographic archival indexing. 
The LTDL is available at http://www.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docsbiblio.
15 Simon Attfield and Ann Blandford, 
‘E-disclosure viewed as ‘sensemaking’ 
with computers: The challenge of “frames”’ 
5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review (2008) 62 – 67.
16 http://www.iwm.org.uk/visits/churchill-war-
rooms.
17 Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, 
WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABORATION 
CHANGES EVERYTHING (2006) New York: B 
and T.
18 On the value of citizen investigative 
journalism as applied to the crowd-sourcing 
of investigations, see Paul Bradshaw 
and Andy Brightwell, ‘Crowdsourcing 
Investigative Journalism: Help me 
Investigate – A Case Study’ in Eugenia 
Siapera and Andreas Veglis, eds, The 
Handbook of Global Online Journalism 
(Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2012).
19 18 U.S.C §§2510-22 (2006).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE §221.1.
21 18 U.S.C §§793-98 (2006).
22 MODEL PENAL CODE §211.1.
23 18 U.S.C §§201-27 (2006).
24 18 U.S.C §§1831-1839 (2006).
25 For instance, see Joris Van Hoboken, Axel 
Arnbak and Nico Van Eijk,’ Obscured by 
Clouds or How to Address Governmental 
Access to Cloud Data from Abroad’, (9 June 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276103.
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opaque and this complicates forensics. Cloud file and 
directory structures are unstable and in constant flux. 
The off-shoring of data and general cloud practices cause 
persistently rotating file locations that tag with frequent 
metadata modifications in activity logs and file access. 
Many nations outside of the United States and Europe are 
typical hosts for cloud services. Most have generally less-
well developed laws regulating privacy and security or 
that create litigation process rights. The prevailing cloud 
practices erect barriers of cost, reliability, and access 
(lack of reciprocity) to conduct accurate forensics due to 
the international location of cloud repositories. Nearly all 
these conditions are inconsistent, not only with U.S.-style 
litigation expectations, but of most jurisdictions across 
the world.
Challenges of digital forensics in the cloud
In the U.S., it is uncertain whether the current rules of 
evidence and trial procedure are adequately adapted 
to the cloud. The cloud, by its nature, is unstable and 
instability is generally inconsistent with traditional 
evidentiary safeguards. Consider that any snapshot of a 
cloud system’s data is not likely to reflect the original data 
exactly; records of all data changes may not be preserved 
adequately; money-saving cloud arrangements probably 
mean that back-up of data is not frequent; storage 
location stability and accuracy of data are compromised. 
Cloud transaction records may fail to accurately identify 
the timing and source of file changes. There are two 
major factors in this cloud unreliability in evidentiary 
preservation: system states are unstable and cloud 
system architectures are not stable.
Cloud system states are unstable 
The cloud is widely promoted as offering an advantage: 
cloud system states are unstable. Files are constantly 
updated, moved to back-up locations, and repeatedly 
imaged, often at alternate locations – a back-up 
security advantage. While this results in a proliferation 
of duplicate data that enables forensic analysis of file 
evolution (development of a manuscript) it also results 
in multiple redundant copies. Duplicates may exist for 
only short, transitory times. Cloud-based files, logs 
and metadata change frequently. These system states 
may sometimes be predictable and well documented 
(logged), but would also be random, unpredictable and 
evanescent at other times. The credibility and forensic 
quality of evidence is undermined by the lack of stability. 
Furthermore, such deficiencies can cause evidence 
to be dismissed for a variety of reasons: authenticity, 
custodial integrity, best evidence, hearsay, exclusionary 
incompetence and relevance.
The most basic forensic challenge of cloud-based ESI 
may be best captured with this ironic query: ‘What is that 
Cloud Server’s Street Address Again?’26 Subpoenas and 
other court process to produce ESI and civil litigation 
pre-trial discovery require accurate physical location 
data for targeted files, back-up data, responsible 
custodians (humans), and knowledgeable supervisors. 
Accurate and stable physical location data enables an 
understanding of a discovery target’s system design and 
practices that informs all other discovery needs.27 Pattern 
interrogatories frequently seek design, vendor and 
configuration data to enable later phases of discovery, 
including interrogatory questions seeking details about 
(i) network infrastructure, (ii) internet access and usage, 
(iii) computers and server hardware, (iv) software 
applications, (v) back-up systems and regimes, (vi) 
electronic communication systems and practices (e-mail, 
voice mail, IM, SMS, work-related social networking), 
(vii) traditional telephony, (viii) mobile (device) 
communications, and off-site work location systems and 
protocols. Similar considerations attend regulatory and 
criminal investigations.
The physical location of records has always been 
a challenge for judicial or regulatory authorities as 
they extend their reach to the physical location of 
information storage. While off-shoring and cloud systems 
use diminishes costs for the cloud consumer, these 
practices actually raise costs for litigation opponents, 
ESI requestors and law enforcement when information 
is stored outside the jurisdiction. Concerns arise when 
cloud repositories are physically located off-shore. Many 
foreign nations fail to fully embrace the full-facts provision 
duties of many nations’ civil litigation and regulatory 
enforcement. This risks inefficient access to relevant ESI 
when it resides off-shore. Furthermore, CSPs probably 
move data frequently to take advantage of cost savings, to 
26 For instance, see, Karyn Benson, Rafael 
Dowsley and Hovav Shacham, ‘Do You 
Know Where Your Cloud Files Are?’ ACM 
Cloud Computing Security Workshop 
CCSW’11, (21 October 2011) and Brandon 
Butler, ‘Do you know where your cloud 
data is? When data goes into the cloud, 
customers may want to know exactly 
where that is, but providers don’t always 
say’, Network World, 25 April 2012.
27 FED.R.CIV.P. 33. Interrogatories frequently 
seek brand, model, design, location 
and custodian information about 
computer and information processing 
systems to aid requesting parties in civil 
discovery in refining their identification 
of deposition targets and drafting 
deposition examination questions, as 
well as the refinement of production of 
(ESI) documents requests, see generally, 
Sharon D. Nelson, Bruce A. Olson 
and John W. Simek, THE ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY HANDBOOK: 
FORMS, CHECKLISTS AND GUIDELINES 
(American Bar Association, 2006).
international aspects of migrating digital forensics in the cloud
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        85© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
permit the rapid movement of resources when necessary, 
and to locate data in jurisdictions with lower regulatory 
burdens (e.g., privacy, security, record retention, 
disclosure duties) – a classic ‘race to the bottom.’ Cloud 
proliferation raises opacity and imposes information 
accessibility challenges that may undercut ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’28 
Cloud architecture is an unstable bundle of contracts
The cloud is actually a collection of numerous services 
and service models susceptible to various architectures. 
Indeed, cloud service providers tout their innovation, 
much of which represents new configurations, controlling 
software, hardware and its physical location, functionality 
and security. The cloud can be expected to evolve with 
changing architecture despite attempts by NIST to define 
stable states. Indeed, the cloud is a technical embodiment 
of Berle and Means ‘Bundle of Contracts’ in which many 
suppliers to the CSP are unaffiliated except through 
outsource sub-contracts.29 Furthermore, it should be 
expected that many contracts in that bundle are not long-
term contracts as were popular in the twentieth century 
as stable sources of supply or long-term loyal customers. 
At-will outsourcing creates an unstable web of contracts 
between client and CSP when the latter outsources or off-
shores cloud services to CSP sub-contractors in real time 
and for various services (e.g., server capacity, increasing 
or decreasing operations, security, connectivity, legal 
services, billing services).
Cloud vendors and consulting services that promote 
migration to the cloud argue that this ‘virtualization’ of the 
cloud, including its inherent instability, is a virtue because 
it is flexible. The cloud is actually defined by its legal 
contracts and not primarily by some technical system 
map or schematic specification. Indeed, technical system 
visualizations seldom adequately detail any nuanced 
terms or conditions of cloud end-user license agreements, 
service level commitments (SLC) or the complex 
outsource service agreements or service-level metrics 
(also known as ‘measurements’) (SLM) that define 
adequate performance, material breach of contract and 
activate contractual obligations (e.g., payments based on 
metered performance, penalties, termination, audit, data 
ownership or other intellectual property rights).
Therefore, the instability of cloud system states and 
architecture, when combined with unpredictable physical 
locations for ESI storage, pose great problems for privacy 
rights or for obtaining access to information in litigation. 
That is, the discovery or investigation target has the right 
to resist ‘fishing expeditions’ and demand a limited scope 
for the investigation or discovery request.
Particularity, minimization and scope
Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,30 
and many other nations’ legal process requirements, 
there is a requirement for ‘particularization’ for search 
warrants and subpoenas.31 Interpretive case law has 
required ‘minimization’32 to avoid ‘fishing expeditions’33 or 
breaching various privileges,34 and discovery rules require 
the scope of all discovery devices be limited by relevance 
to issues expected at trial.35 One benefit claimed by 
cloud providers is ‘co-tenancy’, which particularity acts 
to exacerbate minimization and scope requirements. 
Physically neighbouring virtual drive space, files, and 
sectors are commingled among various individual and 
independent cloud consumers. The data of unaffiliated 
parties is spread throughout the server farm(s) used by 
the CSP for uncertain groupings of clients. This haphazard 
but ‘efficient’ cloud design could be done differently, such 
as in the case of private clouds that have few co-tenants 
or allocate identifiable sectors or servers to particular 
consumers. The particularity requirement is an even 
more challenging problem in discovery of trade secret 
documents36 and possibly for expression protected under 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to avoid 
allegations of the chilling effect of prior restraint.37 
28 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945).
29 Adolf A. Berle, and Gardiner C. Means, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, 2nd edn (Harcourt, Brace and 
World, New York 1967).
30 U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV: ‘The 
right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized,’ (emphasis added).
31 For instance, see Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967) (citing Etnick v. Carrington, 
19 How.St.Tr. 1029 to condemn ‘general 
warrants’ because they lack particularity); 
United States v. Scarfo, 180 F.Supp.2d 
572 (D.J.J.2001) (‘certain modicum of 
particularity’).
32 For instance, see Clifford S. Fishman, ‘The 
‘Minimization’ Requirement in Electronic 
Surveillance: Title III, the Fourth Amendment 
and the Dread Scott Decision’, 28 
AM.UNIV.L.REV. 315 (1979).
33 For instance, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Stephen Smith, 39 
B.C.L.REV. 691 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, 
‘Discovery containment dedux’, 9 B.C. 
L.REV. 747 (1998).
34 For instance, see FED.R.EVID. 502 
(preserving privilege in various situations, 
e.g., inadvertent waiver); FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)
(1) (discovery limited to nonprivileged 
matters); FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(5)(b) 
(mandating pre-trial conference address 
privilege issues in documents produced).
35 FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(1) (duty to disclose 
limited by relevance to claims or defenses, 
trial judge may expand relevance to include 
any matter involving the subject matter in 
the litigation).
36 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-03 
(1967).
37 For instance, see Marcus v. Search Warrant, 
367 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1961); Stanford v. 
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); A Quantity 
of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964); 
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
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Multi-jurisdictional transaction costs 
The providers of cloud services claim that a significant 
advantage is the movement across national borders in 
order to find the lowest costs. The costs of transactions 
are reduced in migrating data over borders at will given 
the high speed and high quality bandwidth increasingly 
available. Cloud services will continue to be complex 
services, created by an intricate web of outsourcing 
contracts. As with all international commerce, the 
enforceability of contracts becomes less certain and 
thereby imposes an increased risk that your side could 
default. It should be expected that cloud services will 
mimic other international commercial practices by 
focusing on international enforcement agreements, 
comity and negotiated choice of law or forum to identify 
and inform business risk analysis.
Data havens cause failure of reciprocity
Reciprocity between state or provincial governments 
and between nations characterize the development of 
international law. Such challenges are overcome despite 
the natural incentives of nations to avoid burden on 
their own citizens, domestic business organizations 
or government entities. Indeed, litigation by foreign 
nationals or governments risk embarrassment, 
international incident and pecuniary liability. Sovereign 
immunity protects government entities from litigation 
or prosecution initiated in or by someone in a foreign 
nation. But this traditional international law concept 
does not, generally, apply to private citizens or business 
organizations and commercial enterprises.38 Indeed, 
confidentiality and privacy exemptions are deeply 
rooted in cultural autonomy. Some nations have had a 
long history in thwarting litigation initiated by foreign 
nationals. Current strong data protection laws are 
further evidence of this self-interested protectionism.39 
Switzerland would appear to have a national business 
model devoted to bank secrecy, making it the 
quintessential banking haven including data transfer 
restrictions that have chronically plagued off-shore efforts 
at justice.40 Bank secrecy has apparently played at least 
some role in preserving Swiss neutrality. However, from 
the perspective of the U.S., European aversion to foreign 
law enforcement and litigation extends beyond bank 
secrecy.
Blocking laws are another exemplar. Consider that 
civil discovery is generally inconsistent with primary 
trust in the inquisitorial powers of trial judges in civil law 
nations.41 Indeed,
 [n]o aspect of the extension of the American legal 
system beyond the territorial frontier of the United 
States has given rise to so much friction as the request 
for documents in investigation and litigation in the 
United States.42 
Blocking laws were originally enacted to prevent foreign 
private plaintiffs and regulators from obtaining document 
production largely to prove antitrust and securities claims. 
Blocking laws are national laws that erect barriers to 
discovery during litigation initiated off-shore. Blocking 
laws take several forms, some broadly protect a specified 
industry from litigation by foreign nationals, while other 
forms of blocking endows regulators with some discretion 
to permit the fulfillment of discovery requests. When most 
narrowly drawn, blocking laws prohibit compliance unless 
that nation’s own procedural requirements are fulfilled.43 
Difficulties from blocking laws eventually prompted 
negotiations in The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law. Some success was achieved in the 
early 1970s when the Hague Conference enacted the 
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence 
Convention) authorizing ‘letters rogatory’ among 
signatory states without the much more uncertain and 
38 See generally, John W. Bagby, and Gary 
L. Gittings, ‘The Elusive Discretionary 
Function Exception From Government 
Tort Liability: The Narrowing Scope of 
Federal Liability’, 30 AM.BUS.L.J. 223-269 
(September 1992) (analytic framework 
for governmental immunity under 
discretionary function exception).
39 Suffice to say that there is a significant 
bibliography relating to the controversy 
over blocking laws.
40 As of this writing, pressures from U.S. 
tax regulators for changes in European 
banking secrecy have resulted in promises 
by Austria and Luxembourg to share bank 
account data, putting further pressure 
on the Swiss to change bank secrecy. 
Some limited Swiss actions to relax bank 
secrecy is underway, but there remains 
strong opposition making wholesale 
repeal unlikely – Raphael Minder, 
‘Pressure Mounts on Vaunted Secrecy of 
Switzerland’s Banks’, New York Times 
(23 May 2013).
41 Although the position is more nuanced, 
for which see the individual chapters 
in Stephen Mason, ed, International 
Electronic Evidence (British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law, 
2008), the main thrust of the point 
remains.
42 For instance, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442, 
Reporters’ Note 1 (1987).
43 David W. Ogden and Sarah G. Rapawy, 
‘Discovery in Transnational Litigation: 
Procedures and Procedural Issues’ (16 
March 2007) ABA Business Law Section 
Spring Meeting – WilmerHale, available 
at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/
newsletter/0058/materials/pp1.pdf. 
See also Yvonne G. Grassie, ‘Foreign 
Bank Secrecy and Disclosure Blocking 
Laws As a Barrier to SEC Policing of 
Transnational Securities Fraud’, 65 
WASH.U.L.Q. 259 (1987); Stephen Mason, 
‘Some international developments in 
electronic evidence’, Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, 2012, 
Volume 18, Issue 1, 23 – 32.
international aspects of migrating digital forensics in the cloud
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        87© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
costly process of pursuing evidence through diplomatic 
channels.44 However, it is yet to be seen whether such 
methods will work in a business environment where so 
much intelligence is based in the cloud.
Addressing cloud forensic risks 
Existing laws and various national and international 
standards already address risks to security and justice. 
The most compelling approach to address these 
risks is to simply adapt these existing authoritative 
constraints to the cloud environment. Some aspects 
require little adaptation and remain consistent with 
strict constructionism45 while others may require an 
evolutionary approach.46 
Role of outsourcing standards
The use of the cloud to facilitate pre-trial discovery is 
a significant method to easily and efficiently exchange 
documents, make these documents available for 
examination to geographically dispersed authorized 
users, and to assure uniformity (i.e., version control). 
Pre-trial discovery, always a costly process, imposes 
burdens for document retention, document search 
and relevance retrieval, document review for privilege 
exclusion, copying and distribution. This burden induces 
settlement incentives. Although the power of networked 
computer systems should have reduced discovery costs, 
instead, the efficiency gains of electronic manipulation 
were overwhelmed by the costs of an increased volume of 
information, addressing problems with duplicate copies 
and preliminary drafts, and using innovative analytical 
techniques.47 Pressures to contain the costs of electronic 
discovery have led to reinforcing the traditional initial 
cost of assignment,48 cost shifting,49 balancing factors,50 
and sampling techniques. Outsourcing data to the cloud 
promises data processing savings but it may place some 
information beyond legal reach in some cases, so overall 
cost reduction is speculative at best given the likelihood 
of unexpected side effects.
CSP are actually independent service organizations 
to whom outsourcing is contracted, and this implies 
outsourcing risks. Academics often use an analogy to 
industrial organizations derived from theories of law 
and economics, as well as from business strategy, 
because these provide useful conceptual frameworks. 
Provisionally, outsourcing is the sub-contracting by 
any type of organization to an external supplier. These 
contracts may source tangible goods from a custom 
product supplier or source services from a service 
organization. Outsourcing IT work is a well-recognized 
subset of the service outsourcing in which expertise 
or work is sought that is either unavailable internally 
or is needed where internal capacity is insufficient, 
too expensive or its elimination is planned. Off-shore 
outsourcing delegates services to service providers 
located in nations outside the organization’s host country.
Since the 1990s, academics have explored many of 
the research questions raised by domestic outsourcing; 
these questions are only complicated by off-shore 
outsourcing. Outsourcing orthodoxy now regularly 
focuses on the identification and valuation of transaction 
cost risks attendant to outsource agreement negotiations. 
There are issues of due diligence failures, service level 
performance (SLP) measurements, dispute resolution 
risks, ownership and control of data and intellectual 
property as well as risks in the maintenance of security, 
confidentiality and the protection of privacy. In practice, 
off-shoring adds jurisdictional uncertainties to the usual 
array of international agreements, including the inevitable 
difficulties caused by widespread ignorance of important 
cultural and infrastructure differences that increase the 
risk of off-shore transactions.
For almost twenty years in the U.S., SAS 70 was 
the primary standard for judging the reliability of IT 
outsourcing to service organizations. Under Statement 
on Auditing Standard No. 70 ‘Service Organizations,’ 
the Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants used a standards-driven 
regime used to review the competence and reliability 
of outsourcing. Audits for IT controls exerted over 
outsourced services are a part of the judgment about 
the reliability of financial statements of publicly-traded 
companies. The review of financial statements of closely-
held, non-public companies are sometimes bound by 
44 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale 
v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 541 
(1987) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure valid 
authority to collect evidence from foreign 
parties for U.S. lawsuits).
45 For instance, see Livingston Hall, ‘Strict or 
Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes’, 48 
HARV.L.REV. 748-774 (March 1935) and 
Thomas Y. Davies, ‘The Supreme Court 
Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: 
The Century of Fourth Amendment Search 
and Seizure Doctrine’, 100 J. CRIM. L. AND 
CRIMINOLOGY 933 (2010).
46 Pamela Samuelson, ‘Five Challenges for 
Regulating the Global Information Society, 
Regulating the Global Information Society’, 
in Christopher T. Marsden ed., Regulating 
the Global Information Society, (Routledge, 
2000).
47 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 358 (1978).
48 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 358 (1978).
49 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
50 GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL 
COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF 
ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION, 
Conference of Chief Justices (August 2006) 
available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/
cdm/ref/collection/civil/id/56.
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audit standards, such as when imposed by a lender or 
regulator requirement. Not-for-profit organizations are 
frequently audited by accounting firms trained in SAS 70 
techniques, and it is predictable that government entities 
will eventually conform to SAS 70 regimen, particularly 
among agencies that obtain access to the capital markets.
To satisfy the aim of international harmonization, in 
June 2011, additional migration was noted from U.S.-
based generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) 
and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
SAS 70 was replaced with Statements on Standards for 
Attestation Engagements No. 16 (SSAE 16). SAS 70’s two 
thresholds for auditing their control effectiveness are 
retained and enhanced by SSAE 16. Type I engagement 
produces a Type I report, a description of the control 
environment and its suitability. The Type II engagement 
produces a report on required tests of the effectiveness 
of the control environment. SSAE 16 now includes a third 
layer that covers a whole accounting period (typically 
fiscal year) and may limit the report’s use to specified 
audiences. Cloud services were frequently identified as 
within SAS 70, but are now covered by SSAE 16 as hosted 
data centers and application service providers (ASP) 
provide cloud services such as SaaS. SAS 70 and SSAE 
16 provide one source of partial relief for cloud service 
customers if the cloud service vendor has negligently 
outsourced component services. Thus, in the cloud 
outsourcing environment, the SAS 70 reports verify that 
the outsource service provider operates faithfully and that 
the outsource customer, often the cloud service provider, 
has controls in place and these controls are working to 
assess default risk.
Role of strong contracts 
Cloud reliability, security and quality can be defined 
in the service provider’s engagement contract. Service 
level commitments (SLC) frequently specify duties and 
performance measurements in service level agreements 
(SLA), overseen by service level management (SLM). SLC 
vary greatly by the type of service involved. A cloud SLC 
is likely to state service measurements (e.g., mips, gigs, 
allowable downtime, network monitoring, speed to reply, 
security breaches, recovery from downtime) expressed 
as mean up or down times. SLC often cover availability 
of data, speed of processing, security arrangements, and 
permit further outsourcing. The pricing relating to the 
ability to adapt to increasing or decreasing demands is 
of particular concern. Compensation levels per unit of 
measured performance (storage units (gigs), transaction 
queries, guaranteed uptime) typically run higher at higher 
levels of service. Prices often rise at the consumer’s 
increased levels of needs. For example, ‘basic’ cloud 
services, initially available at low prices, rise at higher 
levels, a form of ‘bait and switch’. Terms of service may 
also include provisions declaring the consumer’s data 
or other intellectual property are owned by the CSP. 
Provisions may be negotiated about data escrow and 
back-up practices to safeguard against a fundamental 
breach of the SLC.
Cloud services contracts resemble adaptations of 
license and service provider agreements but may also 
function like leases.51 CSPs may become concerned that a 
few jurisdictions will decide that cloud services combine 
tangible goods as products (software) along with services 
(storage).52 Many CSPs outsource component services to 
outsource suppliers, the latter may be domiciled in yet 
other jurisdictions. The enforceability of these outsource 
relations by the consumer of the CSP is doubtful. 
Accountability for full performance of these component, 
outsourced services may not be available to customers 
even under a third party beneficiary theory, making 
litigation against the sub-contractors impractical under 
any circumstances traditionally addressed by third party 
practices (e.g., interpleader, impleading).
Cloud services include typical licensing provisions 
adapted to the cloud service: (1) a grant clause describing 
the services or software or both services and software, (2) 
a co-tenancy clause permitting non-exclusive ‘occupation’ 
of adjoining server capacity, (3) exclusivity requiring the 
cloud consumer to do all its cloud business with that SCP, 
(4) sublicensing provisions permitting the CSP a veto 
over the consumer’s assignment to a successor business 
(e.g., subletting by tenant requiring landlord permission), 
(5) duration and termination provisions, (6) warranties, 
(7) indemnification provisions, (8) definitions of terms, 
(9) disclaimers, (10) choice of law provisions, (11) choice 
of forum clauses, and (12) arbitration requirements 
given the likelihood that data will probably move across 
international borders.
51 John K. Halvey and Barbara Murphy 
Melby, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
OUTSOURCING TRANSACTIONS: 
PROCESS, STRATEGIES, AND CONTRACTS, 
2nd edn (2005, John Wiley NY).
52 Gross v. Symantec Corp., No. C 12-00154 
CRB (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) (holding 
software license constitutes sale of goods 
governed by Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC)).
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Control and ownership of the consumer’s data is a 
common problem in cloud contracts that can negatively 
affect forensics. The CSP might own the consumer’s data, 
impairing forensics, imposing lock-in pressure on the 
cloud consumer to retain the CSP and enabling high-
priced charges for increasing demands.53 Furthermore, the 
CSPs custody or further outsourcing of the consumer’s 
data to independent server farms in another nation adds 
further complication and enhances lock-in.54 When cloud 
consumers regularly back-up their data, it is likely that the 
promised cost savings do not occur. Frustrating forensics, 
the CSP may not be obligated to search for and produce 
particular data (e-mails, files, metadata) without a clear 
SLC term or optional service level at additional cost.
Cloud forensics cause legal conundrums 
One model of cloud forensics involves the initial 
acquisition of ESI from a standalone computer, analyzing 
logs and internet artifacts of cloud transactions that 
could be retained, e.g., Dropbox or Sugar Sync uploads. 
However, the second method occurs when the customer 
obtains remote access to data from a remote system. 
In such a case, an automatic connection and request is 
made to the remote cloud repository for the image, file, 
e-mail and associated metadata. The legal justifications 
for obtaining access to such evidence differs, depending 
upon whether the context is criminal action, regulatory 
investigation or civil litigation.
Assuming the evidence sought is not located within 
the jurisdiction where the court is located, some form 
of remote forensics might be used. This involves the 
acquisition of evidence from a computer over which there 
is control, but which is geographically distant. Travel to 
collect this evidence raises cost issues. While such cost 
savings can be substantial domestically, they generally 
rise much higher internationally. In the U.S. it is expensive 
to image a single computer hundreds of miles away, but 
international travel is typically even more expensive. In 
a civil case, the remote acquisition of evidence from a 
CSP presumes the party is a consumer under a court’s 
jurisdiction and that consumer has contractual rights to 
the data sought.55 
In civil cases, ESI may be acquired remotely under some 
legal authorization, but the ESI must be not privileged. 
The discovery of social media is an increasing source 
of cloud forensic evidence, and no social networking 
privilege appears to exist.56 Traditional civil discovery 
presumes the forum court has jurisdiction over the parties 
and the parties control their respective data. This simply 
enables courts to order discovery of ESI held in the cloud.
Privacy laws may also apply. Under the U.S. federal 
statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), parties may not be able to force third parties 
(e.g., CSP) to produce their client’s ESI, if covered by 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), a component of 
ECPA. The SCA restricts those entities that fall under the 
definition of an ‘Electronic Communications Service’ (ECS) 
or a ‘Remote Computing Service’ (RCS) from voluntarily 
supplying covered communications to an outsider. No 
SCA exception exists for civil litigants to directly request 
records pertaining to opposing parties.57 
A possible resolution is to permit the judge to order 
the party with ‘disposition or control’ over the data (i.e. 
the defendant) to provide the ESI. No litigant with a 
FaceBook account could validly rely on the SCA to refuse 
to comply because they are neither an ECS or RCS under 
the SCA. When the data repository is not a party to the 
litigation, the opposing party would file a motion to 
compel enabling the court to order revelation of that ESI. 
ESI located outside the U.S. or its territories is resolved 
on a case-by-case basis, but would probably require an 
examination of the national laws in the country where the 
data is located.
Criminal procedure issues in cloud forensics 
At the U.S. federal level, authority to issue warrants is 
based upon geographic boundaries. Jurisdiction to issue 
search warrants is governed by the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. A federal magistrate judge may issue 
a warrant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b):
(b) Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a 
federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the 
government:
53 ‘Lock in’ describes customer dependency on 
a particular vendor when changing contracts 
to another vendor would impose high 
switching costs: John W. Bagby, Sandeep 
Purao and Prasenjit Mitra, ‘Standards 
Development, Disruptive Innovation and the 
Nature of Participation: Lock-In, Lock-Out, 
Holdup’, 34TH RESEARCH CONFERENCE 
ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND 
INTERNET POLICY, Telecommunications 
Policy Research Conference (TPRC) 30 
September 2006, Arlington VA available 
at http://faculty.ist.psu.edu/bagby/Pubs/
BagbyPuraoMitraStdsLockHold2.pdf.
54 Witt Ulrich, ‘“Lock-in” vs. “critical 
masses” — Industrial change under 
network externalities’, 15 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 753 
(October 1997) available at http://www.
econ.mpg.de/files/2004/staff/witt_
LockInVSCriticalMasses.pdf.
55 Litigation is also presumed here, but 
consider that in an internal investigation 
(employee browsing adult pornography at 
work) while not a crime, might violate work 
rules and constitute a breach of employment 
contract and thereby cause for termination of 
employment but not immediate litigation.
56 Largent and Largent v. Reed, et al., Court 
of Common Pleas of Franklin County at 9 
(November 7, 2011).
57 Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. 
Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that 
Facebook was both an ECS and an RCS, 
depending upon the function of the site at 
that particular time).
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(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district – 
or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a state 
court of record in the district – has authority to issue 
a warrant to search for and seize a person or property 
located within the district;
(2) a magistrate judge with authority in the district has 
authority to issue a warrant for a person or property 
outside the district if the person or property is located 
within the district when the warrant is issued but 
might move or be moved outside the district before the 
warrant is executed;
(3) a magistrate judge – in an investigation of domestic 
terrorism or international terrorism – with authority in 
any district in which activities related to the terrorism 
may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant for 
a person or property within or outside that district;
(4) a magistrate judge with authority in the district has 
authority to issue a warrant to install within the district 
a tracking device; the warrant may authorize use of the 
device to track the movement of a person or property 
located within the district, outside the district, or both; 
and
(5) a magistrate judge having authority in any district 
where activities related to the crime may have 
occurred, or in the District of Columbia, may issue 
a warrant for property that is located outside the 
jurisdiction of any state or district, but within any of the 
following:
(A) a United States territory, possession, or 
commonwealth;
(B) the premises – no matter who owns them – of 
a United States diplomatic or consular mission in a 
foreign state, including any appurtenant building, 
part of a building, or land used for the mission’s 
purposes; or
(C) a residence and any appurtenant land owned 
or leased by the United States and used by United 
States personnel assigned to a United States 
diplomatic or consular mission in a foreign state.
Some scholars argue that search warrants should change 
in the modern era by revising requirements for search 
and seizure via a warrant that should evolve to reflect the 
realities of search practices, arguing:
‘… that the warrant process must be reformed in 
light of the new dynamics of computer searches and 
seizures. In the last two decades, the widespread use 
of computers has lead to a new kind of evidence in 
criminal cases: digital evidence, consisting of zeros and 
ones of electricity.’58 
For example, Professor Kerr argues the distinction 
between searching and seizing evidence dictates 
change.59 For example, a warrant might be better 
designed if it simply describes the computer to be 
searched rather than its physical location:
‘[I]magine an FBI field office has a computer in its 
possession and needs a search warrant to search 
the machine. The ‘place to be searched’ could be a 
particular description of the computer itself, held in 
the custody of the FBI field office. That is, the warrant 
would name the specific movable property to be 
searched, rather that the physical place where that 
moveable property happens to be stored.’60 
Of course, moving away from geographic based search 
descriptions will undoubtedly raise other problems.
Vagaries of delivering Notice to the cloud 
There are notification difficulties in enforcing search 
warrants for cloud-based searches, mostly due to 
the fact that the search is conducted remotely. Some 
scholars suggest digital searches may currently provide 
inadequate oversight and record-keeping requirements. 
Brenner and Frederiksen argue that better detail is 
needed for inventories accompanying a warrant:
‘These inventories should be supplied in addition to 
the back-up copies of any seized data. The inventories 
are not substitutes for back up copies … For computer 
media or seized files the inventory should describe the 
type of media, capacity (if known), number seized, and 
a listing of the files contained on the media.’61 
However, if the only access to the hard disk drive to be 
58 Orin S. Kerr, ‘Search Warrants in an Era 
of Digital Evidence’, 75 MISS. L. J. 85 
(2005) (arguing search and seizure via 
warrant must evolve given modern search 
practices).
59 Orin S. Kerr, ‘Search Warrants in an Era of 
Digital Evidence’, at 133.
60 Orin S. Kerr, ‘Search Warrants in an Era of 
Digital Evidence’, at 134.
61 Susan W. Brenner and Barbara A. 
Frederiksen, ‘Computer Searches and 
Seizures: Some Unresolved Issues’, 8 
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 39, 98 
(2002) available at http://www.mttlr.org/
voleight/Brenner.pdf.
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searched is through a network connection, it is hard 
to provide some of this other information. Thus, in 
order to search for ESI in criminal matters, or to acquire 
evidence in civil or regulatory cases, when based upon 
a description of the device itself, it may be impossible to 
comply with the legal requirements of inventory, return 
and receipt. Similar difficulties exist for the custodial care 
responsibilities. The officer would have trouble providing 
the required receipt or for the return62 of the property 
seized where the place searched is a computer at an 
unknown location.63 
A recent U.S. federal case in Texas confirms this 
difficulty. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at 
Premises Unknown illustrates why the search warrant 
application ‘specifying’ a computer at an unknown 
location was denied:
‘In early 2013, unidentified persons gained 
unauthorized access to the personal email account of 
John Doe, an individual residing within the Southern 
District of Texas, and used that email address to 
access his local bank account. The Internet Protocol 
(IP) address of the computer accessing Doe’s account 
resolves to a foreign country. After Doe discovered the 
breach and took steps to secure his email account, 
another email account nearly identical to Doe’s – the 
address differed by a single letter – was used to 
attempt a sizeable wire transfer from Doe’s local bank 
to a foreign bank account. … [T]he location of the 
suspects and their computer [was] unknown.’64 
This warrant was not typical, the government sought to 
secretly install data extraction software on the suspect’s 
computer. Once remotely activated, the government 
would have the ‘capacity to search the computer’s hard 
drive, random access memory, and other storage media; 
to activate the computer’s built-in camera; to generate 
latitude and longitude coordinates for the computer’s 
location; and to transmit the extracted data to FBI agents 
within this district.’ The Government sought records of the 
IP addresses used; records of internet activity, including 
firewall logs, caches, browser history and cookies, 
‘bookmarked’ or ‘favorite’ web pages, search terms that 
the user entered into any internet search engine, and 
records of user-typed web addresses; records evidencing 
the use of the IP addresses to communicate with the 
[victim’s bank’s] e-mail servers; evidence of who used, 
owned, or controlled the TARGET COMPUTER at the time 
things described in this warrant were created, edited, 
or deleted, such as logs registry entries, configuration 
file, saved user names and passwords, documents, 
browsing history, user profiles, e-mail contents, e-mail 
contacts, ‘chat,’ messaging logs, photographs, and 
correspondence; evidence of software that allow others to 
control the TARGET COMPUTER was used; and records of 
applications run.
Three significant questions were raised: (1) exceeding 
territorial limits of a Rule 41 search warrant, (2) failure 
to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirements and (3) compliance with Fourth Amendment 
video surveillance using the computer’s attached 
camera.65 Exceeding a warrant’s territorial scope was 
crucial to the judge’s rejection of the government’s 
argument that territorial limits would be satisfied so long 
as the property (ESI) would ‘be examined in this judicial 
district.’66 The judge re-cast this justification as follows:
‘… because its agents need not leave the district to 
obtain and view the information gathered from the 
Target Computer, the information effectively becomes 
“property located within the district”... [thus rejecting 
it because]... a Rule 41 warrant would permit FBI 
agents to roam the world in search of a container of 
contraband, so long as the container is not opened 
until the agents haul it off to the issuing district.’67 
The legality of using such ‘Trojan Horse’ warrants to 
conduct remote searches is suspect. However, Professor 
Brenner argues that Trojan Horse programs to remotely 
search U.S. citizens’ computers does not violate the 
search and seizure protections if the search warrant 
authorizes a remote investigation or a valid exception 
to the warrant requirement exists (e.g., exigency).68 This 
line of reasoning would enable remote and surreptitious 
examination of citizens’ computers. The fruits of such 
investigations would therefore constitute admissible 
evidence in criminal prosecutions. Such a situation differs 
‘wildly from the searches with which the drafters of the 
Fourth Amendment were concerned.’69 
62 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(C) and (D).
63 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer 
at Premises Unknown, No. H-13-234M, 
United States District Court, S.D. Tx (April 
22, 2013) (denying application for warrant 
in part because the location of the targeted 
computer was unknown).
64 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at 
Premises Unknown, at 1.
65 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at 
Premises Unknown, at 2.
66 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at 
Premises Unknown, at 2.
67 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at 
Premises Unknown, at 2.
68 Susan W. Brenner, ‘Remote Computer 
Searches and the Use of Virtual Force’, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1229 (2012).
69 Susan W. Brenner, ‘Remote Computer 
Searches and the Use of Virtual Force’, at 6 
(citations omitted). The author she describes 
is herself.
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The international dimensions of such Trojan Horse tactics 
are also significant.70 ‘Dissonance’ between states and 
nation-states with differing search and seizure standards 
seems likely.71 The most severe case is arguably where the 
search authorizing state or nation permits Trojan Horse 
intrusions but the target jurisdiction, where the data 
is located, does not. The authorizing jurisdiction might 
argue the search occurs within its boundaries while the 
target jurisdiction would have a strong argument that 
the seizure occurred in the target’s territory, but might 
expand that to include the actual search also occurred 
within the target’s boundaries.
A taxonomy developed by Professor Brenner suggests 
the following uncertainties about an Idaho warrant to 
search an Ohio computer:
‘Did the search therefore occur (i) ‘in’ Ohio because 
that is where the target of the search was located, 
(ii) ‘in’ Idaho because that is where the searchers 
were located or (iii) in both? This issue does not 
arise with traditional, non-remote searches because 
the searchers and the target(s) of the search are 
necessarily physically proximate while the search takes 
place. With cyberspace, the search dynamic can be 
altered, so physical proximity is no longer inevitable.’72 
If trans-border wiretapping of telephony is the governing 
analogy, taken from the U.S. federal standard, then ‘the 
communication is “intercepted” where the tapped phone 
is located and where the “listening post” is located.’73 
It seems likely that the party seeking to suppress the 
introduction of ESI acquired in such a Trojan Horse search 
would have a strong argument if the state or nation where 
the process originates prohibits searches outside its 
borders.
Modifying ECPA to enable location-based search 
authority
ECPA and its SCA component74 permits access to certain 
types of communications when stored with certain public 
providers. These provisions are a complex legal morass. 
If ESI is not covered under ECPA, then traditional Fourth 
Amendment principles apply to search and seizure of 
that ESI. ECPA jurisprudence has expanded search and 
seizure capability for the U.S. states by empowering state 
courts to require law enforcement to acquire certain ESI 
outside that state’s boundaries. Indeed, it is generally 
acknowledged that U.S. state courts cannot order that 
state’s law enforcement to acquire from repositories 
physically located in other states.75 ECPA expands the 
traditional state boundary limits under revisions enacted 
following 9.11 in the USA Patriot Act.76 The USA Patriot 
Act expands extra-territorial search powers to state and 
local prosecutors by adding them to the term ‘court of 
competent jurisdiction.’77 As the American Prosecutors 
Research Council eloquently explains:
‘The Patriot Act specifically amended Section 2703(d) 
of the ECPA to authorize state courts of “competent 
jurisdiction” to issue legal process under various 
sections of the ECPA unless “prohibited by the law of 
such State.” §2711(3) defines a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” to issue legal process to include a court 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. §3127. Section 3127(2)(B) 
states “a court of general criminal jurisdiction of 
State authorized by the law of that State to enter 
orders authorizing the use a pen register or a trap and 
trace device.” Thus, state and local prosecutors can 
use the ECPA to obtain, from their own state courts, 
legal process for collection of e-mail information and 
e-mail.’78 
Under this ECPA interpretation, a state court uses the 
power from the Federal statute to compel production of 
certain ESI from sources outside their respective state 
lines. There are other federal statute expansions of state 
powers.79 
Cloud computing raises particular problems in ESI 
acquisition under ECPA. Arguably, this requires a major 
revision of the statute. Georgetown Adjunct Professor 
Marc J. Zwillinger set forth five reasons why cloud 
computing calls for a revision to the ECPA:80 
70 Susan W. Brenner, ‘Law, Dissonance and 
Remote Computer Searches’, 14 UNIV. N. 
CAR. J.O.L.T. (2012).
71 Susan W. Brenner, ‘Law, Dissonance and 
Remote Computer Searches’. 
72 Susan W. Brenner, ‘Law, Dissonance and 
Remote Computer Searches’ at fn. 104.
73 Susan W. Brenner, ‘Law, Dissonance 
and Remote Computer Searches’, citing 
United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 
403-04 (5th Cir. 1996).
74 18 U.S.C. Sect. 2701, and following.
75 For example, see Pa. R. Crim. P. §200, 
which states: ‘A search warrant may be 
issued by any issuing authority within the 
judicial district wherein is located either 
the person or place to be searched.’
76 Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 114 Stat. 272 (26 October 
2001).
77 ‘The ECPA, ISPs and Obtaining E-mail: A 
Primer for Local Prosecutors’, American 
Prosecutors Research Institute, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (July, 2005), 3.
78 ‘The ECPA, ISPs and Obtaining E-mail: A 
Primer for Local Prosecutors’, at 7.
79 18 U.S.C. §2703(e). Another argument 
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Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the 
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23, 2010 Serial Number 111-149 
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1. For materials such as e-mails or private messages 
that are intended to be the most protected, the 
definition of ‘Electronic Storage’ is difficult to apply’.
2. The 180 day rule is arbitrary and based upon a false 
assumption.
3. Congress intended content to be more protected 
than transactional records in theory, but in practice 
content does not get enough protection.
4. The SCA is not technology neutral.
5. The complete silence on access by civil litigants, 
criminal defendants and estates of deceased users 
creates uncertainty and unnecessary litigation.81
The ECPA expands state seizure powers, but its 
labyrinth of exceptions and inane rules need revision. 
For example, the ECPA empowers the state to order 
disclosure of e-mails opened just a few days old via the 
ECPA provisions. However, that same state would be 
forced to apply for and obtain a search warrant in another 
state where those same e-mails were downloaded to a 
computer user’s computer located there.
If consent is absent, a state court order compelling 
acquisition of remotely accessed ESI stretches the 
jurisdictional limits of current state law. Cloud forensics 
involves obtaining access to computer systems. At 
present, it is uncertain whether state courts may mandate 
search and seizure (remote search), when the ESI is 
located outside their jurisdiction using a computer located 
within their jurisdiction. While computer forensics has 
long utilized these technologies to remotely acquire 
evidence through a network, the authority of a court 
to order and compel law enforcement is analogous to 
ordering an officer to go out of state to seize evidence, a 
practice not generally allowed without the cooperation 
of local law enforcement. Similar territoriality problems 
are inherent in international cloud forensics. At both civil 
and criminal levels, crossing borders implicate the other 
sovereign state’s laws.
Assume this scenario: a state court a issues search 
warrant to search a folder stored in the ‘cloud’ by a CSP. 
The folder contains both communications and documents. 
The folder is clearly accessible through the computer 
located in Pennsylvania, being mapped as a drive thereon. 
Would such a search be legal? An initial question is: who 
is the target? The U.S. Fourth Amendment does not apply 
to non-citizens if the search is conducted outside the U.S. 
At least one U.S. case exemplifies this position.82 
In 1999, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) unsuccessfully sought assistance from Russian 
authorities to detain a suspected hacker, Alexey Ivanov 
who had allegedly intruded into ‘the computer systems 
of businesses in the United States’ to steal financial 
information and engage in extortion allegedly threatening 
public disclosure and embarrassing exposure. The FBI 
resorted to an undercover operation to lure Ivanov and 
his partner Vasiliy Gorshkov, to Seattle for a promised 
interview with a telephone company, Invita. The Russians 
demonstrated their hacking skills using Invita computers, 
not knowing the FBI had installed key loggers to record 
keystrokes. Their credentials (usernames and passwords) 
were used to obtain access to the Russian computers 
remotely from the U.S. and download 250 gigabytes of 
their data. The Russians were arrested and indicted. When 
the Russians attempted to suppress the ESI as evidence 
in their prosecution, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 
District Court that the U.S. ‘Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to searches. . . search[es] and seizures seizur[es] 
of a non-resident alien’s property outside . . . the United 
States.’ As non-resident aliens and the search made on a 
server on Russian soil, the search was entirely in Russia.
Thus, when the target is a foreign national, the remote 
search would not violate the Fourth Amendment because 
it does not apply to aliens and for searches conducted 
on foreign soil. However, this does not address the ESI 
of U.S. citizens located on foreign soil, a scenario that 
describes perhaps a majority of cloud ESI search and 
seizure potential in the modern environment.
There may be laws other than ECPA and SCA that 
would prohibit remote searches. In ‘Law Enforcement 
Challenges in Transborder Acquisition of Electronic 
Evidence from “Cloud Computing Providers”’,83 Professor 
Schwerha outlined some of the legal difficulties posed 
by the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, 
which the United States has signed and ratified. While the 
convention does not function as a domestic U.S. law, it 
could act as an argument as to how to interpret U.S. law 
because when the U.S. ratified the same, it essentially 
verified that its laws were in harmony with the articles set 
forth in the Convention. That discussion paper primarily 
addresses the existing problems with acquiring ESI 
81 ‘Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: 
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Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties 
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internationally from SCPs. The primary section of the 
Convention on Cybercrime applicable to transborder 
searches is article 32, which states as follows:
Article 32 – Trans-border access to stored computer 
data with consent or where publicly available a Party 
may, without the authorization of another Party:
a. access publicly available (open source) stored 
computer data, regardless of where the data is 
located geographically; or
b. access or receive, through a computer system 
in its territory, stored computer data located in 
another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and 
voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful 
authority to disclose the data to the Party through 
that computer system.’
Articles 31, 33 and 34 also deal with transborder 
acquisition of evidence, though only with cooperation. 
Article 32 primarily covers remote searches. Cloud 
computing provides various challenges:
1. It is impossible to know where the sought after 
data resides;
2. If you do not know where the data resides, then 
you cannot determine what laws apply;
3. The idea that the investigating officer may 
have to get consent brings about numerous other 
difficulties;
4. If the investigative authority searches the 
computer possessed by a suspect that utilizes the 
services of a Cloud Computing Provider, then any 
data obtained there from might be meaningless; 
and
5. There could be significant difficulties in admitting 
the evidence obtained from a Cloud Computing 
Provider.
Thus, it is very hard to recognize a clear solution for 
making cloud forensics universally legal without staying 
within a single jurisdiction. Curiously, many people would 
practice due diligence before buying property or starting a 
business in an unfamiliar state or country with unfamiliar 
laws. But, increasing numbers of people show little self-
restraint in storing their valuable data in whatever state, 
nation or jurisdiction chosen by their ‘free’ on-line storage 
provider.
Are there solutions? 
The law traditionally adapts to new technologies 
somewhat more slowly than the technologies change. 
The car and telephone ushered in big changes, eventually 
resulting in the development of whole fields of new law. 
The most significant legal challenge posed by cloud 
forensics is that the internet fails to respect borders, at 
least most of the time. It may be ‘cool’ and exciting to 
have immediate, ubiquitous and authorized access to one 
or more computers from another country at any one time. 
However, inherent procedural difficulties are created by 
the physical, cultural and legal barriers to cloud forensics, 
in civil, regulatory and criminal procedural contexts, both 
domestically and internationally.
Solutions should move away from traditional 
geographic boundaries as the method of determining 
legality. Perhaps some sort of minimum contacts 
analysis under the watershed U.S. Supreme Court 
case International Shoe might guide how, whether and 
when remote acquisition is appropriate.84 This might be 
affected as part of the initial scheduling conferences for 
trials, or like a temporary restraining order (TRO) hearing 
for evidence. A standard might require a showing that 
the party seeking remote access could prove there is a 
likelihood that the evidence sought is relevant, and that 
the least intrusive and successful method would be direct 
acquisition via a cloud forensic tool. Similar such hearings 
authorize evidence acquisition by the U.S. Marshal in 
Federal civil cases. Criminal courts also have a long 
history of considering the propriety of allowing compelled 
acquisition of evidence through applications for warrants 
and other procedural mechanisms.
Perhaps the data, not the repository’s owner, sub-
contractor or server, must have had some minimum 
contacts with the jurisdiction seeking its acquisition 
remotely. Therefore, if the data had been utilized in 
commerce previously within that court’s jurisdiction, the 
test of within the boundaries would be met. For example, 
assume a plaintiff wants access to files the defendant has 
remotely stored in another nation. Perhaps, the defendant 
counters it is limited by CSP contract to read-only access 
by the defendant’s wholly-owned subsidiary. Under 
this set of facts, a court could determine that once the 
data had been used in the forum court’s jurisdiction, an 
inherent right exists to review that data as part of the 
84 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945).
international aspects of migrating digital forensics in the cloud
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        95© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
pending proceedings.
However, it might require new laws to authorize law 
enforcement (criminal) or the courts (regulatory, civil) 
to make production, search and seizure mandatory 
because that data was stored on or was accessible 
through a computer system within the jurisdiction. 
Perhaps that translates to mandatory domestic back-
ups for data stored remotely. Database registration, not 
unlike the requirement in the European Union that every 
organization processing personal data is required to 
notify the relevant authority, might also enable access 
rights under service of court process (i.e. subpoena, 
warrant). The concept of geographically-based jurisdiction 
must be reexamined at the domestic level. Defining 
search as the acquisition of evidence via a computer from 
within the jurisdiction of the court could then lead to the 
principle of remote acquisition of ESI from that computer 
being properly authorized.
Conclusion 
Technological evolution continually challenges existing 
law. However, the evolution of the law typically lags 
behind technology development, relegating law to play 
a perpetual catch-up role. The development of the cloud 
as a ubiquitous storage repository and software (‘app’) 
service provider fundamentally changes the relationships 
between users and suppliers of software and hardware. 
The cloud reinforces the need for reliable connectivity and 
fundamentally changes the software business model from 
unlimited use under purchased license to ‘pay per use’ 
when software is provided as a service (SaaS). Of course, 
the risks of exploitation from this lock-in must be weighed 
against the enormous economic pressures to save 
capital expense by moving to the cloud and enable more 
work from mobile devices. Cloud and SaaS are actively 
marketed for immediate cost savings, promised benefits 
of productive work anywhere, and to attain the benefits of 
quick shifts in demand through the seemingly unlimited 
ability of the cloud to deal quickly with increasing 
demand.
Expanding functionality of computing equipment 
in general and mobile devices in particular is clearly 
evident. Law must be flexibly drafted to accommodate 
rights given such transformational technologies. No 
longer should statutes, regulations and case law assume 
existing technology will continue unchanged for any 
foreseeable future. Instead, law should be intentionally 
written to address both the contemporary problem at 
hand while retaining flexibility to adapt as technology 
evolves. Of course, this is challenging, particularly 
for the constitutionality of penal statutes that must 
be fairly precise. Nevertheless, the future of design, 
functionality, ownership and use should be considered 
in drafting opinions, regulations and statutory language. 
Legislative history has always been a useful source of 
such forward-looking adaptability. Similarly, general and 
enduring principles, sometimes composed as elements, 
enable stable precedents. Flexible law can adapt to 
changing technology more readily than overly detailed 
specifications that are technology-specific.
The case of mobile devices such as smart phones 
makes a compelling case for both flexibility and a 
functional rather than a design orientation in defining 
rights, duties, and prohibited behaviours. Miniaturization, 
a corollary to the increasing storage capacity represented 
in Moore’s Law,85 made mobile device computing power 
increases inevitable. The geolocation revolution spurred 
on by global positioning services (GPS) but now enhanced 
with other technologies (e.g., cell triangulation, RFID) may 
have been less foreseeable than miniaturization. Privacy 
law lags behind the use of location-based advertising 
architectures significantly, and so many users remain 
unaware of the privacy issues that the law may be unable 
to reclaim such privacy rights.86 
Document retention policies are always challenging. 
Three major incentives coalesce to place pressure on 
the need for official policies, and these are too often 
not well followed in practice. First, there are increasing 
business reasons for data retention. The major function 
of information sciences, the management of information 
systems and the search disciplines are to expand the 
usefulness of data mining and analysis, a form of sense-
making.87 Second, various statutes require data retention 
of fairly specific types of documents for generally specific 
durations. Third, retained data may expose its owner, 
author and others implicated thereby to litigation risks 
when that data concerns wrongdoing. One argument 
is that these new and expansive repositories of data 
may increase data availability for useful and mandatory 
purposes but it also increases exposure to the risk of 
liability. Under this argument, transition to the cloud 
is unlikely to reduce exposure to risk derived from 
revelations that a party might be to blame.88 
Of course, if CSPs expressly or impliedly promise 
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document destruction when convenient to avoid 
embarrassment of liability, then the cloud itself may 
destroy some evidence. Cloud services are so frequently 
hosted in other jurisdictions or other nations, that 
discovery, investigations and forensics may actually be 
obstructed more effectively. Indeed, the international 
aspects of cloud computing are daunting. Without robust 
and enforceable memoranda of understanding (MOU) 
for law enforcement cooperation, it will become difficult 
to discover or forensically investigate any files stored 
outside the nation of litigation. Thus, an individual 
person’s files as well as business records held in the 
cloud might regularly elude law enforcement, regulators 
and opposing civil litigants.
In sum, the increasing adoption of cloud services 
imposes vast new challenges to criminal law enforcement, 
regulatory enforcement and civil litigation. Cloud data 
may be impossible to delete, but forensic techniques 
and jurisdiction of most tribunals is not sufficiently 
well-defined yet to assure use of cloud data effectively in 
legal proceedings. But then hiding incriminating data on 
‘another planet’ may actually be a smart strategy.
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